INTRODUCTION
it is widely reco~nlzed that the process of understandln~ natural language texts cannot be accomplished without accessin~ mundane Knowledge about the world [2, 4, 6, 7] . That is, in order to resolve ambiguities, form expectations, and make causal connections between events, we must make use of all sorts of episodic, stereotypic and factual knowledge. In this paper, we are concerned with the way functional knowledge of objects, and associations between objects can be exploited in an understandln~ system.
Consider the sentence (1) Jonn opened the Oottle so he could pour the wine.
Anyone readin~ this sentence makes assumptions about what happened which go far beyond what is stated. For example, we assume without hesitation that the wine beln~ poured came from inside the bottle. Although this seems quite obvious, there are many other interpretations wnlcn are equally valid.
Jonn could be fillin~ the bottle rather than emptyln~ the wine out of it.
In fact, it need not be true that the wine ever contacted the bottle. There may have been some other reason Jonn had to open the bottle first. Yet, in the absence of a larger context, some causal inference mechanism forces us (as human understanders) to find the common interpretation in the process of connecting these two events causally.
In interpreting this sentence, we also rely on an understanding of what it means for a bottle to be "open".
Only by usin~ Knowledge of what is possible when a bottle Is open are able we understand why John had to open the Pottle to pour the wine out of It. Stron~ associations are at work here nelpin~ us to make these connections. A sentence such as (2) John closed the bottle and poured the wine. appears to be self contradictory only because we assume that the wine was in the bottle before applyln~ our knowledge of open and closed bottles to the situation. Only then do we realize that closing the bottle makes it impossible to pour the wine. Now consider the sentence (3) John turned on the faucet and filled his glass.
When reading this, we immediately assume that John filled his glass with water from the faucet. Yet, not only is water never mentioned in the sentence, there is nothing there to explicitly relate turning on the faucet and filling the glass. The glass could conceivably be filled with milk from a carton. However, in the absence of some greater context which forces a different interpretation on us, we immediately assume that the glass is being filled with water from the faucet.
Understanding each of these sentences requires that we make use of associations we have In memory between oPJects and actions commonly InvolvlnE those objects, as we were able to increase the interpretive power of the analyzer in order to handle sentences of the sort discussed earlier.
What follows Is a brief description of the seven Object Primitives.
A more thorough discussion can be found in [5] . For those unfamiliar with the primitive acts of Schank's conceptual dependency theory, discussions of wnlch can be found in [10, 11] . Faucets must be turned on, wine bottles must be opened, and lamps are either turned on or lit depending on whether or not they are elsctrJo.
The
The Object Frlmltlve CONSUMER Is used to describe objects whose primary Function Is to cons, me other objects. A trash can is a CONSUMER of waste paper, a draln is a CONSUMER of liquids, and a mailbox ts a CONSUMER of mail.
Some objects are both SOURCEs and CONSUMERS. A pipe is a CONSUMER of tobacco and a SOURCE of smoke. An Ice cube tray Is a CONSUMER of water and a SOURCE of ice cu~es.
Many objects can be described In part
by relationships that they assu~e with some other objects. 
THE INITIAL ANALXSIS
In the processing of the sentence "Jo~n opened the bottle so he could pour the wine," the phrase "John opened the bottle," is analyzed to produce the Followin~ representation: Other Object Primitives may also lead to expectations for actions, as we snail see later.
When a match Js found, further conceptual checks are made on the enabled act to ensure that the action described "makes sense" with the particular objects currently fJlllng the slots In that acts description. When the match Is based on expectations derlved from the CONNECTO~ description of a container, the check Is a "contalner/contents check," which attempts to ensure that the object found in the container may reasonably be expected to be found there.
The sentence "John opened the bottle so ne could pull out the elephant", is peculiar because we no associations exist wnlch would lead us to expect that elephants are ever found in bottles.
The strangeness of this sentence can only be explained by the application of stereotypic knowledge about what we expect and don't expect to find inside a bottle.
The contalner/contents cnecK is similar to the test described above In connection with the CONTAINER-FINDER demon.
That is, the bottle is checked by both the DEFAULT-CONTAINMENT test and the COMMON-SOURCE test for known links relatin~ wlne and botles.
When this check succeeds, the enable llnk has been verified by matcnlng an expected action, and by checking restrictions on related objects appearing intne slots of that action. The two CD acts that matched are then merged.
The merging process accomplishes several tnJn~s.
First, it completes the linking of tne causal chain between tne events described in the sentence.
Second, it causes the filling of empty slots appearing in either the enabled act or In the enabling act, wherever one left a slot unspecified, and the other had that slot filled. These newly filled slots can propagate back along the causal chaln, as we shall see in the example of the next section.
3.~ CAUSAL CHAIN CONSTRUCTION
In processin~ the sentence (~) John turned on the faucet so he could drinK.
the causal chain cannot be built by a direct match with an expected event.
Additional inferences must he made to complete the chain between the actions described in the sentence.
The representation produced by the conceptual analyzer for "John turned on the faucet," Is *John* <~> *ooe ]J~ result Sfaucet e ~ (SOURCE with OUTPUT • ~water e)
As with the bottle in the previous example, the description of the faucet as an active SOURCE of water is based on information found beneath the prototype for faucet, descrlbLnE the "on" state for that object.
The principle e~pectatlon for SOURCE objects is that the person ~o "turned on" the SOURCE object wants to take control of (and ultimately make use of) whatever it is that Is output from that SOURCE.
In CD, this is expressed by a template for an ATRANS (abstract transfer) of the output object, in this case, water. An important side effect of the construction of this expectation is that a token for some water is created, which can be used by a slot-filling Inference later.
The representation for "he could drink" Is partially described ~y an INGEST with an unspecified liquid in the OBJECT slot. A special request to look for the missing liquid Is set up ~y a demon on the act INGEST, similar to the one on the PTRANS in the previous example. This request finds the token for water placed In the short term mamory ~nen the expectation that someone would ATRANS control of some water was generated.
• faucet* ~ (SOURCE with OUTPUT = *watere)
III
,. (possible enaOled action) HI ;i ,1" "El ?HUMO ?HUMO <=> ATRANS <-ewatere < The causal chain completion that occurs for thls sentence is somewhat more complicated than It was for the previous case.
As we nave seen, the only expectation set up by the SOURCE description of the faucet was for an ATRANS of water from the faucet. However, the action that is described here is an INGEST with Instrumental FTRANS. When the chain connector rails to find a match between the ATRANS and either the INGEST or its instrumental PTRANS, inference procedures are called to ~enerate any oOvlouS intermediate states that might connect these two acts.
The first inference rule that is applied Is the resultatlve inference [8] that an ATRANS of an object TO someone results in a state where the object Is possessed by (POSS-BY) that person.
Once this state has been ~enerated, it is matched a~alnst the INGEST in the same way the ATRANS was. When this match fails, no further forward inferences are ~enerated, since possession of water can lead to a wide ran~ e of new actions, no one of wnich is strongly expected. The backward chaining Inferencer Is then called to generate any ~nown preconditions for the act INGEST. The primary precondition (causative inference) for drinking is that the person doing the drinking has the liquid which ~e or she Is about to drink. This inferred enaolln~ state is then found to match the state (someone possesses water) Inferred from the expected ATRANS. The =arch completes the causal cnaln, causing the merging of the matched concepts.
In this case, the mergln~ process causes the program to infer that it was procaoly John who took (AT~ANSed) the water from the faucet, in addition to turning it on. Had the sentence read "John turned on the faucet so .Mary could drlnK."p the program would infer that Mary took the water from the faucet. 
C
It ta important to understand how OPUS differs from previous inference strateKies in natural language processing.
To emphasize the original contributions of OPUS we will compare it to Rie~er's early work on inference and causal chain construction.
Since Rie~er*s research is closely related to OPUS, a comparison of this system to Rieger's pro;rum will illustrate which aspects of OPUS are novel, and which aspects have been inherited.
There is a ~reat deal of similarity between the types of inferences used In OPUS and those used by Rte~er in his description of Mt~qORX [8] . The causative and resultative inferences used to complete the causal chain in our last example came directly from that work. In addition, the demons used by OPUS are similar in flavor to the forward inferences and specification (slot-filling) inferences described by Rieger. Expectations are explicitly represented here as they were there, allowing them to be used In more then one way, as In the case where water is inferred to be the ~/Gg~Ted liquid solely from its presence in a previous expectation.
There are, however, two ways in which OPUS departs from the inference strategies of Mb~OR¥ In significant ways. (1) On one the level of computer implementation there is a reorganization of process control in OPUS, and (2) on a theoretical level OPUS exploits an additional representatLonal system which allo~m inference generation to be more stronBly directed and controlled.
In terms of implementation, OPUS integrates the processes of conceptual analysis and memoryohased inference prooeantnB. By using demons, inferences can be made during conceptual analysis, as the conceptual memory representations are ~enerated.
This eliminates much of the need for an inference discrimination procedure aoting on completely pre-analyzed comoeptuaiizations produced Py a separate program module. In ,~tOR~, the processes of conceptual analysis and inference ~sneration were sharply modularized for reasons which were more pragmatic than theoretical. ~ough is Known about the interactions of analysis and inference at this time for us to approach the two as Initially, input consisted of concepts coming from the parser. MEHORX then attempted to sake inferences from the conceptualizations which it itself had produced, repeating this cycle until no new inferences could be ~enerated.
Causal chains were connected ~nen matches were found between inferred concepts and concepts already stored In Its ~emory. However, the Inference mecnanlsms used were in no way dlrected speclflcally to tne task of making connections between concepts found In its Input text. This lead to a comblnatorlal explosion in the number of inferences made from each new input.
In OPUS, forward expectations are based on specific associations from the objects mentioned, and only when the objects in the text are described in a manner that indicates they are being used functionally.
In addition, no more than one or two levels of forward or backward Inferences are made before the procedure Is exhausted, the system stops once a match Is made or It runs out of highly probable inferences to make. Thus, there is no chance for the ~Jnds of comblnatorlal explosion Rieger experlenced.
By strengthenln~ the representation, and exploiting an integrated processing strategy, the comblnatorJal explosion problem can be eliminated.
OPUS makes use of a well structured set of memory associations for objects, the Object Primitives, to encode Information which can be used in a variety of Rleger's qeneral inference classes.
Because this
